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Issue I

COURT REPORTS

statute. The court held the 100-foot buffer zone was reasonable in
view of the statute's purposes. The court also held the regulatory
powers that the Amendments granted the Commission were within the
broad powers case law bestowed on inland wetlands agencies. The
court rejected Queach's argument that the 100-foot buffer zone was
not supported by evidence in the record.
Queach contended the Connecticut Legislature's 1995 enactment
of state statutes that provided municipal agency regulations shall
"apply only to those activities which are likely to impact or affect an
inland wetlands area" limited the case law cited. The court disagreed,
stating legislative history indicated the statutes simply codified relevant
case law.
Queach also challenged the portion of the Amendments that
identified as a "significant activity" "any activity which causes a
substantial diminution of flow of a natural watercourse, or
groundwater levels of the regulated area." The court reasoned that an
activity causing a substantial diminution of flow of a natural
watercourse or of groundwater levels could plainly have an adverse
effect on the health of affected wetlands. Accordingly, the court held
this portion of the Amendments was also consistent with the supreme
court's broad construction of the Act.
Finally, Queach argued several other provisions of the
Amendments effectively required an applicant to submit alternatives to
the Commission, even if the proposed use of the property did not have
any effect or impact upon wetlands and watercourses. The court
stated the provisions applied only to applications to undertake
regulated activities. The court stated, under the purposes and policies
of the Act, the Commission may consider all relevant facts and
circumstances, including feasible and prudent alternatives to the
proposed regulated activity that would cause less or no environmental
impact to wetlands or watercourses. Thus, the court concluded the
required listing of alternatives was reasonable and consistent with the
Commission's broad legislative mandate. Therefore, the court held
the Amendments were facially valid.
Kathryn S. Kanda
FLORIDA
Barley v. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 766 So. 2d 433 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2000) (holding a constitutional amendment ("Amendment 5"), which
required polluters to pay for water pollution abatement, did not make
it unconstitutional to tax non-polluter property owners under the
Everglades Forever Act because Amendment 5 lacked enabling
legislation, and thus could not be implemented).
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The 1994 Everglades Forever Act ("Act") authorized the South
Florida Water Management District ("District") to levy a tax on
property owners within the district for pollution abatement purposes.
Non-polluter property owners within the taxation district claimed they
could not be taxed under the Act because Amendment 5, adopted in
1996, prohibited this taxation. Amendment 5 made property owners
within the district who caused pollution primarily responsible for
paying the abatement cost of their pollution. Thus, non-polluter
property owners argued they could not be taxed under the Act
because Amendment 5 superceded the general provisions of the Act.
The non-polluter property owners unsuccessfully challenged the
District's statutory basis to tax under the Act in the Circuit Court for
Orange County and appealed to the Court of Appeals of Florida, Fifth
District.
In affirming the circuit court, the appellate court based its holding
on a Supreme Court of Florida advisory opinion that stated
Amendment 5 was not a self-executing amendment. This advisory
opinion elaborated by stating the Act was not the enabling legislation
for Amendment 5. Because the Act was not Amendment 5's enabling
legislation and Amendment 5 had no enabling legislation, the Act
would be effective until the legislature expressly repealed it.
The appellate court held it could not tell the legislature when to
enact legislation nor dictate the substance of legislation. As a result,
the appellate court lacked the power to override the will of the people
who adopted Amendment 5, which required supplemental legislation
prior to enactment. Thus, the appellate court affirmed the circuit
court by holding Amendment 5 lacked enabling legislation, the Act
was still good law, and property owners within the district could be
taxed under the Act regardless of whether they were polluters or nonpolluters.
Kirstin E. McMillan
VLX Props., Inc. v. S. States Utils., Inc., No. 5D99-3314, 2000 Fla. App.
LEXIS 9251 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. July 21, 2000) (holding that, in the
case of flooding due to release of treated wastewater from a wastewater
treatment plant with the power of eminent domain, the legal standard
for inverse condemnation is the standard of physical invasion and not
the deprivation of all reasonable use of the property).
VLX Properties, Inc. ("VLX") owned part of James Pond ("Pond")
which was inadvertently included in an agreement between a golf
course owner and a wastewater facility ("SSU") for disposal of treated
wastewater. VLX planned to use the area around the Pond to develop
homes. However, flooding from the Pond due to the release of the
wastewater made those plans impossible. VLX filed a petition for
inverse condemnation. The trial court ruled VLX did not meet the

